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United States v. Hays:
A Winnowing of Standing to Sue in Racial
Gerrymandering Claims
In United States v. Hays,1 the United States Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether individuals who reside outside racially
gerrymandered districts have standing to sue on racial gerrymandering
claims. In May 1992, Louisiana passed Act 42 of its Regular Session,
which redrew its district boundaries to form two majority-minority districts 2 -Districts 4 and 2.? District 4 was a "Z-shaped creature"4 that
zigzagged through twenty-eight parishes and five major cities, yet the
Act was precleared by the United States Attorney General. The
plaintiffs, Hays et al., were residents of Lincoln Parish, which was
located in the newly formed District 4, and brought suit to challenge Act
42 under state and federal constitutions as well as under the Voting
Rights Act of 1965.' The State removed the case to the United States
District Court for the Western District of Louisiana.6 While the case
was pending in the district court, the United States Supreme Court
decided Shaw v. Reno,7 and the district court, following the Shaw rule,
held Act 42 unconstitutional and enjoined its enforcement? Louisiana
and the United States-intervening as a defendant-subsequently
appealed to the United States Supreme Court. While the appeal was
pending, the Louisiana Legislature repealed Act 42 and instituted Act
1 of the 1994 Second Extraordinary Session, which redrew District 4 to

1.

115 S. Ct. 2431 (1995).

2.

A majority-minority district is one "in which a majority of the population is a

member of a specific minority group." Voinovich v. Quilter, 113 S. Ct. 1149, 1151 (1993).

3. Hays, 115 S. Ct. at 2434.

4. Id,
5. Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973a(a) (1985).
6. Hays, 115 S. Ct. at 2434.

7. 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993). The Court held that a reapportionment plan which
.rationally cannot be understood as anything other than an effort to separate voters into
different districts on the basis of race" is an unconstitutional gerrymander, and the entire
state suffers an injury in fact. Id. at 2828-30.
8. Hays, 115 S. Ct. at 2434.
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exclude Lincoln Parish.9 The Supreme Court vacated the district court's
decision and remanded the case for further consideration in light of the
new Act 1.10 The district court allowed the plaintiffs to amend their
complaint to challenge Act 1 and held the Act unconstitutional for
largely the same reasons as its decision regarding Act 42.11 The
district court further enjoined Louisiana from conducting elections,
substituted its own redistricting plan, and denied Louisiana's request for
a stay of judgment pending appeal. 2 Louisiana and the United States
again appealed to the Supreme Court, which stayed the judgment of the
district court pending appeal."3 The Supreme Court held that the
plaintiffs had no standing to sue, because
where a plaintiff does not live in [a racially gerrymandered] district, he
or she does not suffer [the representational harms of racial classifications in the voting context], and any inference that the plaintiff has
personally been subjected to a racial classification would not be
justified absent specific evidence tending to support that inference."'
In order to fully understand the significance of the Supreme Court's
holding in Hays, the reader must have a working knowledge of the
"standing to sue" doctrine generally and as it applies to civil rights and
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In 1975, the
Supreme Court decided Warth v. Seldin 5 and provided a comprehensive analysis of the standing doctrine and its purposes. The Court
determined that the primary question of standing was "whether the
litigant is entitled to have the court decide the merits of the dispute or
of particular issues."'
There are two dimensions to this question--"constitutional limitations on federal-court jurisdiction and
prudential limitations on its exercise"' 7-both of which are founded in
a concern about the proper role and proper limitation of courts in a
democratic society." The constitutional dimension demands that a
plaintiff make out a "case or controversy" within the meaning of Article
III of the Constitution in order for the courts to entertain a suit. 19

9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 2434-35.
12. Id. at 2435.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 2436.
15. 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
16. Id at 498.
17. Id
18. Id
19. Id. A crucial aspect of the justiciability of a case is the plaintiffs stake in the
outcome of the controversy. Id. at 498-99.
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The courts are not warranted in exercising their remedial powers on the
plaintiffs' behalf in the absence of such a claim, because the Article III
powers are designed only to redress individual harms to the complaining
party, even though the judgment may benefit others collaterally.2" The
Court, in United States v. Richardson,2 further explained that a
"'fundamental aspect of standing' is that it focuses primarily on the
party seeking to get his complaint before the federal court rather than
'on the issues he wishes to have adjudicated.'"2 2 In its 1992 decision in
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,' the United States Supreme Court
outlined the requirements for standing as well as its pleading requirements at the different levels of litigation and encompassed all prior case
law at the time.24 The Court reduced the elements of standing to a
minimum of three:
First, the plaintiff must have suffered an "injury in fact"-an invasion
of a legally-protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized
... and .(b) "actual or imminent," not "conjectural" or "hypothetical
.. " Second, there must be a causal connection between the injury

and the conduct complained of-the injury has to be "fairly trace[ablel
to the challenged action of the defendant, and not... th[e] result [of]
the-independent action of some third party not before the court...."
Third, it must be "likely," as opposed to merely "speculative," that the
injury will be "redressed by a favorable decision."'
The Court further analyzed the "injury in fact" requirement in Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War2 by holding that a plaintiff
did not have standing to sue for generalized damages that all citizens
share as a result of governmental action. The Court said that without
the requirement that the plaintiff suffer a concrete and particularized
injury, the Court would not be able to formulate a reasonable rule based
on a factual context within which the parties argue.28 The Court in
Lujan stated that the plaintiff must meet different pleading require-

20. I
21.

at 499.

418 U.S. 166 (1974).

22. Id. at 173.
23. 504 U.S. 555 (1992).

24. Id. at 560-61.
25. Id.
26.

418 U.S. 208 (1974).

27. Id. at 220.
28. Id. at 221. However, in Warth v. Seldin, the Court stated that those persons to
which Congress has particularly granted rights of action may have standing "to seek relief
on the basis of the legal rights and interests of others, and, indeed, may invoke the general
public interest in support of their claim." Warth, 422 U.S. at 501.
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ments at the different stages of litigation." General factual allegations
of injury which result from the defendant's conduct will suffice at the
pleading stage.3 ° In response to a summary judgment motion, the
plaintiff must set forth specific facts which are supported by affidavit or
other evidence." Finally, if the plaintiff's facts are controverted at the
32
last stage, the evidence adduced at trial must support those facts.
The Court, in FW/PBS v. Dallas," stated further that, even if the
parties did not raise the issue of standing and the lower courts had not
addressed it, the Court must address the issue and the parties cannot
waive it.m As all areas of the law differ, so does the standing doctrine
differ in its development in different areas of law. The Voting Rights
Act of 1965 added specificity to the "injury in fact" requirement of
standing by requiring a plaintiff to be an "aggrieved person" instituting
a proceeding under the voting guarantees of the Fourteenth or Fifteenth
Amendments." One of the first cases in the civil rights/equal protection arena to address a standing issue was Baker v. Carr.'
The
plaintiffs were voters who lived within a county affected by a state
apportionment statute, and they brought an action against the state
claiming that their voting rights had been impaired. 7 The Court held
that the plaintiffs had standing to sue because they were directly
affected by the statute.' In 1972, the United States District Court for
the District of Maryland faced a claim that a redistricting plan violated
the rights of a candidate for Congress. 9 The candidate claimed that
the plan created a racial imbalance in his district and that his campaign

29.

Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561.

30. Id. This requirement follows the requirements set by Rule 8(a) of the FEDERAL
RULES OF CwL PROCE6URE that "[a] pleading which setsforth a claim for relief... shall
contain (1) a short and plain statement of the grounds upon which the court's jurisdiction
depends...."

31. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561. The trial and reviewing courts must accept these facts as
true and must construe the complaint in favor of the complaining party. The trial court
may also allow or require the plaintiff to supply further particularized facts deemed
supportive of the plaintiffs standing. If all materials of record do not adequately reflect

plaintiff's standing after this opportunity, the complaint must be dismissed. Warth, 422
U.S. at 501-02.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561.
493 U.S. 215 (1990).
Id at 230-31.
42 U.S.C. § 1973a(a) (1988).

36. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
37. Id. at 207-08.

38. Id. at 208. The Court reasoned that by residing in a racially gerrymandered
district, the plaintiffs were in a position of"unconstitutionally unjustifiable inequality" and
therefore had a "legally cognizable injury." Id.
39.

Shapiro v. Maryland, 336 F. Supp. 1205 (D. Md. 1972).
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would be adversely affected.' The court found that the candidate had
no standing because he was not harmed by being forced out of a racially
balanced district into a racially imbalanced district, particularly because
he was not a resident of the district which was affected by the plan.4'
The court stated that the candidate would have conceivably had
standing to challenge the whole redistricting plan, but such was not the
claim before it."2 By this time, the courts were moving toward a
concession that parties might have standing by challenging an entire
redistricting plan rather than proving that they were residing in a
particular district adversely affected by the plan. This concessiop
became fully realized in Heckler u. Matthews,4 a case involving an
equal protection challenge to a pension offset provision. A retiree
brought a class action suit challenging a pension offset exception that
allowed for certain monies to flow to women rather than men and
claimed that the provision subjected men to unequal treatment solely on
the basis of sex." The Court stated that the retiree had standing
because his alleged injury in fact was a stigmatic injury which the Court
The Court explained
has "long recognized as judicially cognizable.'
standing
in a claim where the
for
allowing
reason
that the underlying
is
that
injury
harm is a stigmatic
[D]iscrimination itself, by perpetuating "archaic and stereotypic
notions" or by stigmatizing members of the disfavored group as
"innately inferior" and therefore as less worthy participants in the
political community ... can cause serious non-economic injuries to
those persons who are personally denied equal treatment solely
because of their membership in a disfavored group.4"
The Court further refined the analysis of a stigmatic injury claim in
Allen v. Wright."7 The plaintiffs brought suit against the IRS claiming
that the IRS was violating the law by allowing tax exemptions to
discriminatory private schools." The Court held that the plaintiffs had

40. Id-at 1208.
41. Id. See also Chavis v. Whitcomb, 305 F. Supp. 1364, 1390 (S.D. Ind. 1969)
(plaintiffs were not harmed and had no standing because they did not live in the district
affected).
42. Shapiro, 336 F. Supp. at 1209.
43. 465 U.S. 728 (1984).
44. Id. at 738.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 739.
47. 468 U.S. 737 (1984).
48. Id. at 740-43. The plaintiffs were parents of black children who were attending
schools undergoing the process of integration. The IRS was supposed to grant tax
exemptions to schools that either had successfully integrated or were in the process of
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no standing because they did not allege a stigmatic injury of the kind
involved in Heckler.49 The Court reasoned that an abstract stigmatic
injury, if allowed as sufficient to permit standing, would extend to all
persons of the group affected. by the government's alleged wrongful
conduct and could undermine the requirement of a personal injury.' °
The Court, therefore, narrowed the eligibility of the stigmatic injury to
support standing by stating that "[tihe stigmatic injury thus requires
identification of some concrete interest with respect to which [plaintiffs]
are personally subject to discriminatory treatment."1 In Shaw v.
Reno,5" the Court broadened the availability of the stigmatic injury as
an injury in fact to uphold standing. In that case, the plaintiffs-five
white voters--challenged a redistricting plan which created a majorityminority district whose boundaries followed an interstate highway. The
plaintiffs claimed .that the plan created an unconstitutional racial
gerrymander and violated their rights to a "color-blind" election."3 The
Court found that the reapportionment plan "rationally cannot be
understood as anything other than an effort to separate voters into
different districts on the basis of race ... ."
The stigmatic injury in
racial gerrymandering cases is concrete enough to satisfy the Allen v.
Wright test of showing a concrete injury directly resulting from the
harmful action, because such action "reinforces racial stereotypes and
threatens to undermine our system of representative democracy by
signaling to elected officials that they represent a particular racial group
rather than their constituency as a whole."55 The Court also stated
that standing would not be denied the plaintiffs simply because they
were white and did not live within the district affected by the plan,
because such a reinforcement of racial stereotypes harms the whole state
which adopts such a plan.5

integration and deny such exemptions to schools that were racially discriminatory. Id49. Allen, 468 U.S. at 755. The Court stated that the plaintiffs had not shown that the
stigmatic injury they suffered had a causal connection to, and flowed as a direct result of,
having been denied equal treatment. Id. Rather, the plaintiffs relied on their rights to
have the government act in accordance with the law, and such a claim is not judicially
cognizable. Id. at 754-55. See also Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418
U.S. 208, 220 (1974).
50. Allen, 468 U.S. at 755-56.
51. Id. at 757.
52. 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993).
53. Id.at 2820, 2824.
54. Id.at 2828.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 2830. On remand to the district court as Shaw v. Hunt, 861 F. Supp. 408
(E.D. N.C. 1994), that court held that
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The decision in United States v. Hays8 7 was primarily a reaction to
the development of the stigmatic injury as a tool for upholding standing
and particularly the injury in fact requirement, which culminated in
Shaw v. Reno" and its result on remand in Shaw v. Hunt."9 The
Court began its opinion in Hays by reviewing the requirements of
standing and immediately addressing the issue of generalized grievances.' The Court made clear that generalized grievances against alleged
wrongful government conduct will not meet the standing requirement of
injury in fact, and it pointed to Allen v. Wright for support."' The
Court reviewed its reasoning in Shaw for allowing a stigmatic injury to
suffice for the injury in fact requirement, but rejected the plaintiffs'
argument that everyone in the state had a claim because each person
must prove that they have actually been injured. 2 The Court realized
the difficulty in demonstrating individualized harm and created a
solution by separating claims between those who live inside districts
affected by redistricting plans and those who live outside such districts." The Court reasoned that, naturally, those who live within such
districts are going to be'directly affected by a plan which focuses on their
district, while those outside such districts are only going to be indirectly
affected.6 The Court therefore decided that those within the affected
districts will have standing, while those outside the affected districts
must overcome, with specific evidence, a presumption that they are not
harmed." If plaintiffs who live outside the affected districts do not
include specific evidence in the complaint, the Court explained, they will
be asserting a generalized grievance which has already been shown,
through Schlesinger and Allen, not to support standing.6 The Court

[alny person who can show that a redistricting plan has assigned him to vote in
a particular district at least in part because of his race has standing to challenge
it, even if he cannot show that it has caused any concrete injury to his political
interest. In this context, the "injury in fact" presumably is the state's decision to
deal with the voter as a member of a particular racial class, rather than as an
individual, in assigning him to a voting district, which is an affront to his
.personal dignity."
Id. at 426.
57. 115 S. Ct. 2431 (1995).
58. 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993).
59.

861 F. Supp. 408 (E.D. N.C. 1994).

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

115 S. Ct. at 2435.
Id.
Id. at 2436.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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then focused on the case before it and addressed the plaintiffs' lack of
specific evidence showing that they had been injured by the redistricing
plan. 7 Although the plaintiffs had shown that the Louisiana Legislature was aware of the racial composition of the plaintiffs' new district,
the Court stated that "proof of '[tihat sort of race consciousness' in the
redistricting process is inadequate to establish injury in fact," because
the "legislature always is aware of race when it draws district lines.'
The Court further explained that even if the plaintiffs had shown that
the legislature had an improper motive in redrawing District 4, no
inferences could be drawn from that motive and applied to District 5,
where the plaintiffs resided. 9 With respect to the absence of specific
evidence showing individualized harm, the Court concluded that it had
"never held that the racial composition of a particular voting district,
without more, can violate the Constitution. "7O Finally, the Court
entertained the plaintiffs' analogy of their situation to that in Powers v.
Ohio,71 where the Court held that an individual has a right not to be
excluded from a petit jury on account of race.72 The Court distinguished Powers on the basis that the plaintiff in that case had suffered
a concrete injury that was realized at the time of the harmful act-being
excluded from the jury.7' The plaintiffs in this case may have had a
right not to be excluded from a certain district on account of their race,
but the Court said that the plaintiffs had not shown that they suffered
such treatment.7 4
The effects of the decision in Hays are significant. The Court did not
overrule its decision in Shaw v. Reno,75 but it restricted the application
of that decision. The white voters in Shaw were not precluded from
making a stigmatic injury claim, yet if the decision in Hays were
retroactive those same voters would be denied standing. The voters
were not residents of the gerrymandered district and had no specific
evidence supporting their injury in the complaint, so standing would

67.

Id.

68. Id.
69. Id.
70.
71.
72.

Id. at 2437.
499 U.S. 400 (1991).
Hays, 115 S. Ct. at 2437.

73. Id.
74. Id. Justice Stevens concurred in the opinion because the plaintiffs had not shown
that they were harmed, but he did not agree with the majority's view that the plaintiffs
would be better off if they resided in the gerrymandered district. Id. at 2440 (Stevens, J.,
concurring). Justice Stevens agreed with the majority that the plaintiffs' residency, by
itself, does not give them standing, but he did not believe that the plaintiffs' residency, by
itself, could preclude them from having standing. Id.
75. 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993).
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have been denied under the Hays doctrine. As a practical matter, the
decision in Hays will have differing results. Not only will the decision
ease judicial administration and discourage nongenuine claims, but it
will also effectively change the application of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 8(a) on racial gerrymandering cases, modify the pre-existing
pleading rules for standing in that area, and give rise to possible future
equal protection problems. By forcing those who are not residents of the
district which is being racially gerrymandered to provide specific
evidence of harm, the Court created a clear rule that makes it easier to
determine which plaintiffs have standing. Rather than wasting time
and money on a case only to find that the plaintiffs were not harmed
and had no standing at the outset,7" the Court eliminated most
standing problems before the parties come to trial. The Court altered
the pleading requirements for standing-at least in their application to
racial gerrymandering cases--created in Lujan by negating one of the
stages. After Hays, at the pleading stage the plaintiff will either make
general allegations of fact if that party is a resident of the gerrymandistrict or make those allegations and support them by affidavit
dered
or other
specific evidence if that party lives outside such district. 77 The
pleading requirement at the summary judgment stage is effectively
negated by the decision in Hays because 1) there is a presumption that
residents of a gerrymandered district are harmed, 78 and 2) nonresidents
of gerrymandered districts have already supported their facts with
affidavits or other specific evidence at the pleading stage. By creating
this new first pleading requirement, the Court will dispose of those cases
in which the plaintiff has no standing before the case comes to trial.
The new pleading requirement may also discourage nongenuine claims
by those who seek a remedy without having been wronged. It is
conceivable that those who are residents of gerrymandered districts may
bring nongenuine claims,79 but such claims will be few, if any, as a
result of the Court's presumption of harm to those residents. The real
effect will be on claims by nonresidents. Unless nonresidents can
support allegations of injury with specific evidence in the complaint, they

76. Such was the case in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
77. Originally the plaintiff had to state general factual allegations at the pleading

stage, support the facts with affidavit or other evidence on a motion for summary
judgment, and, finally, support those facts, if controverted, by all the evidence adduced at
trial. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561.
78. Hays, 115 S. Ct. at 2436.
79. Although the Court has presumed that residents of racially gerrymandered districts
are harmed, not all residents may be harmed in fact. There may be those who bring claims
and have not suffered a concrete injury resulting from the mandate of segregation that a
racial gerrymander represents.
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will lack standing for failure to meet the pleading standards. 0
Whereas nonresidents were encouraged by the expansive rule of Shaw
v. Reno to bring claims, there is now a disincentive for nonresidents to
bring claims."1 Not only did the Court affect the pleading requirements
of standing, but it also changed Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a).
Rule 8(a) requires the plaintiff to provide a short and plain statement
upon which the court can rest its jurisdiction. After Hays, the plaintiff
must present virtually the entire case, including such supplementary
material as affidavits, in the complaint rather than the short and plain
statement allowed before. 2 It would seem that the Court legislated
rather than interpreted the Rule as it unilaterally changed the Rule in
relation to racial gerrymandering cases. The change is narrow in scope,
though, and deals with a highly litigated area of the law. Were the
Court to wait for Congress to pass an amendment to the Rule, even more
money and time would be wasted on nongenuine cases and the judicial
process in this area would remain cumbersome. Although the Court's
holding serves to ease judicial administration and discourage nongenuine
claims, it could also pose a constitutional problem. The Court has
created a virtually unintelligible distinction between residents and
nonresidents of racially gerrymandered districts, which may result in
equal protection problems. Although an equal protection problem
regarding standing to sue will receive low scrutiny by the courts--even
in the arena of racial gerrymandering-there is no real difference
between residents and nonresidents in reference to racially gerryman83
dered districts, as Justice Stevens noted in his concurring opinion.
Those who reside outside the gerrymandered district may be harmed in
the same manner and receive the same injuries as those who are
residents of that district.84 The Court made clear in Shaw v. Reno that
racial gerrymandering harms everyone-including those outside the
affected district-by "reinforc[ing] racial stereotypes and threatenting]
to undermine our system of representative democracy." 8 In fact, the
Court agreed in that case that white voters not residing in the gerrymandered district were harmed by being denied the right to a "colorblind" election." The only difference between residents and nonresidents of gerrymandered districts who are harmed equally is that
residents do not have to carry as heavy a pleading burden as nonresi80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Hays, 115 S: Ct. at 2436.
113 S. Ct. 2816, 2830 (1993); see also Shaw v. Hunt, 861 F. Supp. 408, 426 (1994).
Hays, 115 S. Ct. at 2436.
Id. at 2440 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Id.
113 S.Ct. at 2828.
Id. at 2824.
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dents. 7 The Court offered no special reason for drawing the distinction
other than a conclusory presumption that those who do not reside in
gerrymandered districts suffer no harm from the gerrymandering."
Even under low level scrutiny, the Court may not have given a rational
reason for drawing this distinction. The practical effects of the decision,
which were probably foremost on the Justices' minds at the time, would
serve as a rational basis for separating residents from nonresidents. . Yet
the problems that the decision could create and the rights that it might
suppress probably outweigh the need to ease judicial administration and
discourage nongenuine claims.
JACK PRITCHARD

87. In fact, residents are presumed to be harmed and therefore have little or no
pleading requirement to sustain standing initially, while nonresidents must carry the
unusually heavy burden of supplying evidence to support their allegations of harm in order
to get a foot in the courtroom doors.
88. Hays, 115 S. Ct. at 2436.

